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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
MARJORIE LEE BAKER,
Plaintif!-Respondent,

vs.

ALVIN D. BAKER,

Case No.

12098

Defend ant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case is before the court to review certain findings
and orders of the Trial Court regarding child custody, support payments and the award of attorney fees in a divorce
action.

DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
On April 13, 1970, the Trial Court entered its Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law arid Decree of Divorce, ·wherein
the 1]efendant was granted the divorce and ordered to pay
cet tain monthly obligations of the family totaling $253.00
Pei· rrcnth ancl including a mortgage payment, and the
was granted the permanent custody of the children
cf i·he parties, plus additional support payments of $50.00
l'"l'

month per child and attorney's fee of $550.00 for the
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use and benefit of her attorney. This appeal relates to
the award of the children's custody to the plaintiff, the
child support payments and the award of the attorney's fee.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Inasmuch as this is an equitable matter upon appeal,
the defendant seeks to have the findings of the Trial Court
modified by this Court, and to enter findings as follows:
1.

That the permanent custody of the children should
be awarded to the defendant instead of to the plaintiff.

2.

That the defendant pay no additional support payments, other than monthly installments on family
indebtedness, and that the plaintiff repay all payments made to her by the defendant to date.

3.

That each party bear their own expenses and attorney fees in maintaining this action, and that
any attorney's fees paid by the defendant to the
plaintiff be returned to the defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties were married at Salt Lake City, Utah, on
June 29, 1956. As a result of said marriage there were
born to the parties three children, namely: Alvin Biff
Baker, born July 22, 1957; Jerry Dean Baker, born April
13, 1959; and Bambi Lee Baker, born December 27, 1961.
On October 1, 1968 the wife, Marjorie Lee Baker, filed
a Divorce Complaint in the District Court of Salt Lake
County, whic:h was answered by the husband, Alvin D.

Baker, on October l, 1968, at which time the husband also
filed a Counterclaim for divorce and asking for custody of
the children.
On the 13th day of November, 1968, the Trial Court
ordered the parties to "attend the Family Counseling Service" and that the minor children of the parties be interviewed and evaluated by a staff member in order to determine which parent should be awarded the permanent
custody of the minor children of the parties. Said evaluation was read to counsel for both parties by the Trial Judge
on May 14, 19G9, and filed with the Clerk of the Court on
May 19, 1969, (T. 20).
At the commencement of the trial on June 12, 1969,
the Court first interviewed two of the minor children of
the parties, and because of what appeared to possibly be
nndue influence by both parties on their children, the Court
continued the trial until August 1, 1969. At the conclusion
of the trial, the Trial Judge requested counsel to submit
memoranda to the Court to assist the Court in reaching
its decision (T. 21-26).
On October 3, 1969, (T. 27-28) the Court did enter a
memorandum order, at which time, among other things, the
husband was awarded the divorce, the wife was awarded
"probationary" custody of the children, the Court agreed
to reconsider the question of permanent custody after January 1, 1970, each party was to pay his own costs and attorney's fees, the husband was ordered to obtain "extra
employment consistent with his teaching obligations" in
on.;cr to "put himself in a position to pay some support for

the children" and to reappear before the Court within 30
days to review the matter of child support.
On October 20, 1969, upon motion of the wife, the Court
issued an Order requiring the husband to appear before
the Court to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for his actions and vvhy he should not be ordered to
assist the plaintiff financially (T. 40). On November 3,
1969, the Court, by way of letter ( T. 38) did inform counsel for the parties of the decision reached on the hearing
held on October 28, 1969. In that decision, the Trial Court
ordered, among other things, that the defendant pay the
plaintiff an additional $50.00 per month per child as child
support, and $550.00 for the use and benefit of her attorney.
On December 16, 1969, based on written instructions by
the Court, the defendant's attorney prepared and submitted
to the Comt for its signature, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce (T. 42-45 and T.
48-55). On December 18, 1969, the defendant moved the
Court to amend its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Lavv (T. 46-47). Said Motion was heard on February 9,
1970, (T. 56) and denied, although there is no written
Order in the transcript which reflects the same.
By agreement between the parties, the further hearing by the Court regarding the permanent custody of the
minor children was held on Apnl 13, 1970. The plaintiff at
that time again asked that the defendant be found in contempt of Court (T. 57-58) which Motion was denied. At
said hearing the Court did grant the permanent custody of
the minor children to the plaintiff and on April 17, 1970,
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the Court entered new Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (T. 59-65) and a Decree of Divorce (T. 66-69).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO THE PLAINTIFF, AND THAT THE PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE C H I L D R E N SHOULD BE
AWARDED TO THE DEFENDANT.
Point I will show that the Trial Court erred in
awarding the permanent custody of the children to
the plaintiff. In so doing it will be demonstrated that
the Trial Comt's findings were not consistent with the
facts, and that the Trial Court's order was contrary to the
best interests of the children.
A.

The awarding of the children by the Trial Court
in a divorce action is an equitable matter, and both
the findings and law are subject to review on
appeal.

The Utah Statutes authorizes the Trial Judge to "make

such orders in relation to the children * * * as may be
equitable". ( U. C. A. 1953, 30-3-5.) The leading cases in
th is .i nrisdiction have held that the decision of the Trial
Comt regarding the custody of the children will not be
diEJtul'bed unless the evidence clearly preponderates against
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the findings of the Trial Court. 1 These cases have also held
that "no firm rule can be uniformly applied in all divorce
cases, and that each must be determined upon the basis of
the immediate fast situation." (Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah
2cl 79, 296 P. 2d 977 (1956)), and that a "judgment should
not be upset unless it works such an inequity or injustice
or places one of the parties in such an impractical situation,
that equity and good conscience demaond that it be revised". (Watts v. Watts, supra note 1.) In Wiese v. Wiese,

note 1 supra, this Court held: "* * * We may be persuaded that a finding is against the preponderance of the
evidence to such an extent that we would be justified in
disapproving it or even making a finding of our own."
The defendant urges that the evidence does preponderate against the findings of the trial court. The evidence
in this matter is such, that the finding of the Trial Court
is so inequitable and unjust that both equity and good conscience demand that the finding of the Trial Court should
be rnoctified and a new finding made by this Court, granting custody of the minor children of the parties to the defendant.
The Trial Court awarded the permanent custody of
the children to the plaintiff (T. 61) but found that "neither
of the parents is unfit as a parent, but that each of them
h8s been negligent in some respects so far as the best inter-

v. McBroom. 14 Utah 2d 393, 384 P. '..'d 961 (1S<i:1):
DeRo<e v. DeRose 19 Utah 2r1 77, 42(-) P '2r'
( 1YC7): Watts V
Watts. 21 Utah 2<l 137, 442 P. 2rl 30 (1q;-;s); Wiese v. Wiese

1See

Utah 2d ...... 469 P 2d 504 (1D70)

7

est of the children are concerned" (T. 61). In determining
this fact, the Trial Court "took in consideration both the
advantages each parent has to offer the children" (T. 61).
The Trial Court then specified the advantages that it considered the plaintiff had over the defendant as follows:
"The Court feels that the plaintiff mother is the more
stable emotionally" and "because of her special training
and background in working with emotionally disturbed
children" (T. 62, lines 1-3). The defendant alleges that
said findings by the Trial Court are not consistent with
the record.
B.

The Trial Court erred in finding that the plaintiff
was "more stable emotionally" than the defendant.

The plaintiff as a parent is not more stable emotionally
than the defendant as a parent. In order for the Court to
find that the plaintiff was "more stable emotionally"
than the def end ant, there should be some showing in the
record of the lesser emotional stability on the part of the
def end ant. The only evidence the defendant can find, that
was introduced to the Court, that might suggest that the
defendant husband was not emotionally stable was testimony by the plaintiff and her witness George Delanor
Jermayne (T. 120, 127) that the defendant husband followed the plaintiff on many occasions, because he wanted
to know why his wife was getting home from her work at
school so late, what her conduct was with certain other
men and that the defendant asked two of the children of
'
the parties if they wanted to continue to live like they had
hcen (T. 118). Such evidence is not sufficient to support

the Trial Court's conclusion that the defendant was not as
emotionally stable as the plaintiff. Surely a husband has
the right to inquire into the unexplained activities of his
wife, and to inquire if his children wanted certain unfavorable conduct to continue.
Defendant cannot see why a husband should be considered emotionally less stable than his wife simply because
he wants to know the whys and wherefores of her unexplained and questionable conduct. The plaintiff gave the
defendant sufficient grounds to be suspicious of the conduct and activities of the plaintiff, as is hereafter set forth.
Mr. Jermayne (Germain) testified that the plaintiff consistently left school by at least 4 :00 to 4 :30 p.m. (T. 127,
line 20) and yet the children testified that their mother
was always late getting home from school (T. 87, line 11;
101, line 27; 196, line 19; 365, line 9); that their mother
did not like their father to ask why she was late (T. 104,
line 5) ; and that their mother would laugh at their father
when he would inquire as to her reasons for always getting
home late (T. 103, line 24). If such conduct would not
cause the average man to become emotionally distraught,
then perhaps the sight of seeing his wife rub another man's
feet in the presence of his children (T. 96, line 14; 100, line
25; 250, line 104), or finding her parked with the same man
in secluded places when she was supposed to be to a teachers' meeting, on more than one occasion (T. 27, 229); or
having her report she was going out to the theatre on numerous occasions, yet never attending the same, yet still putting at least 21 extra miles on the car (T. 231); or having

her cease to be accommodating to him as his wife (T. 233)
are surely adequate grounds for the defendant to become
emotionally upset at his wife's conduct. In fact the defendant became so upset with the conduct of his wife, that he
had to be taken home from work in an ambulance because
of his nerves (T. 228, line 3), which he at first thought was
a heart attack. To the discomfort and enxiety of the defendant, the nervous problem with his heart persisted
thereafter (T. 228). The plaintiff does not deny the same
and her reply to the defendant's request for her to stop was
that she could see no wrong in her conduct, and that she
would keep on doing it (T. 228, line 16). The undisputed
testimony by the defendant was that this conduct by the
plaintiff had been going on for about four years (T. 224),
and that prior to that time, he had had a good
with her (T. 233). The plaintiff's witness Jermayne (Germain) testified that the defendant had told him a year before this proceeding that defendant's marriage had been
a happy one (T. 134), but that because of the conduct of
his wife, he now wanted a divorce from her (T. 134). The
plaintiff construed the defendant's suspicions as being unfounded and a conspiracy against her (T. 189) and that as
a result the defendant had attempted to alienate the children from her (T. 176, 189). The defendant would urge that
if he was in fact not as emotionally as stable as the plaintiff's wife, that the plaintiff's conduct was the cause of his
lack of emotional stability. However, the defendant believes
that the record fairly indicates that the plaintiff, because
of her conduct, is not as emotionally stable as the defendant. The evidence further indicative of the plaintiff's apI
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parent lack of emotional stability is set forth hereafter.
1.

Plaintiff cannot control her urge to steal. Both
of the older children testified that this was one of
the reasons that they did not want to live with
their mother. All of the children have seen her
steal. The children saw their mother steal pink
beads (T. 91), silver goblets (T. 91), a fly-tying
book (T. 91), Shasta pop (T. 92, 355, 365), 4
paintings (T. 92), records (T. 108), towel rack (T.
110), a can of white spray paint (T. 160), cosmetics ( T. 354), and a display rack (T. 354).

2.

Plaintiff finds it difficult to tell the truth. Under
cross-examination the plaintiff admitted that she
had had a Mr. Fleisher, who was a married
man, in the bedroom of her home at night; that his
wife had come and got him; but that said conduct
was proper since it was about 9 :00 p.m.; that at
least one of her children was in the room with
her; and that her bedroom door was unlocked (T.
201). However, that same child, which she claimed
was in her room, told a different story. He testified that about 11 :00 p.m. he was awakened by a
banging at the family home; that he went upstairs
to investigate and found that someone was at the
front door; that he had then gone to his mother's
bedroom where he found that her bedroom door
was locked; and that he then went back to answer
the door where he found a lady who wanted to
know if a Mr. Fleisher was there (T. 118). This
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i:1ciclcnt was a furthe1· reason why this twelve year
old child did not want to live with his mother. This
'.11c>'::m: :s demonstrative of the fact that the plaintiff had no qualms about lying under oath. In addition, the plaintiff testified that she used $200.00
sl1e
from her mother to open a banking
acccullt C1'. 302). When the records of the checking account we1·e examined, the plaintiff could not
identify the deposit of her mother's "loan" (T. (T.
305) and finally testified that in fact the account
was opened with $75.00 from her household expense account (T. 303, 304). While these inconsistencies are minor on first appearance, they are
indicative of the plaintiff's inability to tell the
truth. She was trying to cover up how she had
been able to purchase $500.00 worth of stock (T.
301) and then got caught in her own lie.
3.

Plaintiff is unable to personally implement her
verbalization as to a mother's responsibilty. The
plaintiff verbalized well as to what she felt were
her responsibilities as a mother (T. 186). However, the plaintiff was apparently unable to put
her verbalization into action. The children testified that she was late gettmg home to them (T.
87); that she fixed meals late (T. 106); that the
meals were good when they had company, but
otherwise not so good; that she didn't mend their
clothing (T. 351); that their father had to do her
"work" in the house (T. 87); and that she would
leave them without letting them know where she

was going (T. 160); that she let a married man put
his arm around her (T. 352); that she had another
married man in her locked bedroom late at night
when his wife came to get him (T. 118). The
plaintiff's problem is accentuated by the fact that
she teaches Home Economics (T. 170).
In addition, the conduct by the plaintiff which
lead to the defendant's nervous reaction is also an
indication of the plaintiff's lack of emotional stability.
4.

The defendant as a parent is an emotionally stable
person. By comparison to their mother; the children testified that the defendant always came right
home after school (T. 88); that he prepared them
good meals (T. 87); that he took good care of
them (T. 87) and that there was nothing about
their father that they disliked (T. 163), and that
every one of them preferred to live with their
father (T. 105, 116, 168, 352, 365, 372).
In view of the foregoing, the defendant urges
that the Trial Court's finding that the plaintiff was
"more stable emotionally" than the defendant is
in error.

C.

The Trial Court erred in finding that the plaintiff
works with emotionally disturbed children.

The second reason the Trial Court found that the plaintiff was better equipped to have the custody of the minor
children was "because of her special training and back-

grn1.rnd in working with emotionally disturbed children"
( T. 62). Inasmuch as it is not merely a matter of semanticc>, and since foe Trial Court has used this as a basis for
g1·anting custody to the mother, it should be pointed out
that this finding is in no way supported by the evidence.
In addition, the defendant questions the relevancy of the
Trial Court considering the same since there was no showing that the children of the parties are emotionally disturbed. Nevertheless, plaintiff testified that she taught
"special education for the retarded and ... Social Studies,
language arts, physical education, home arts" (T. 170).
Special education for the retarded which the plaintiff is
engaged in, is not the same program, as working with emotionally disturbed children. The transcript reflects that in
fact it was the defendant who was trained and worked
with emotionally disturbed children ( T. 243). If working
with emotionally disturbed children is to be the criteria for
awarding the custody of the children, then the custody
should have been granted to the defendant.
D.

The Trial Court's award of the permanent custody
of the children to the plaintiff was contrary to
the best interests of the children.

In March, 1969, the counselor appointed by the Trial
Court to interview the parties and their minor children,
although making no recommendations as to custody, found
that the children related better to their father than to their
mother and that the children preferred to live with their
fathel' (T. 20).
On June 12, 1969, in the Chambers of the Trial Court,
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only the two older children \Vere interviewed; however,
beth cf them indicated that they wanted to live with their
father (T. 90, 105). (Because the Trial Court was then
concerned a!Jout what the Court felt was undue influence
on the children on the part of both parties (T. 139, 14f>),
th'? Trial Cc,U't continued the trial of the matter until Aug1, 1%9.)

On Aug;_rnt 1, 1969, the Court interviewed all of the
children in chambers. The Court asked "where t1o you feel
it vrnuld be best for you to liYe?" (T. 152). The oldest son
testified that he didn't know whe1·e it would be best for
him to live (T. 152, line 24). Upon further inquiry by the
Trial Court as to whether the proceedings had him upset,
the oldest child then testified that the Judge "sort of made
him nervous" (T. 153). It is also important to note that
the plaintiff had had the children out fishing or on other
activities almost constantly from the time of the trial on
June 12, 1969, to the trial on August 1, 1969, (T. 153-154),
and that afterwards the plaintiff or her parents would say
"See your father would never take you doing that" (T. 154,
155) . It would appear to even the most casual of observers
that such conduct by the plaintiff or her parents would undoubtedly have caused undue influence upon this child.
However, the Trial Court made no finding of the same.
At the trial on August 1, 1969, both of the other children stated their preference to live with their father (T. 150,
168). Although the Trial Court did grant the defendant
the divorce after the trial on August 1, 1969, the custody
of the children was temporarily continued in the plaintiff
on a probationary basis until after January 1, 1970.

lo
On April 13, 1970, the Trial Court again interviewed
the minor children in chambers. At least one of the children testified that he had had no discussions with his father
about his mother since the last hearing (T. 367, 369) and
there was no indication by the other children that they had
recently had any undue influence exerted upon them by
eib(T pan:nt. Nevertheless, each of the children expressed
that they felt that it would be ''best" for them to live with
thei1· father rather than their mothe1· and that they preferred to live with their father rather than their mother
\T. i\52, ::3G.5, :.172). Each of the children also stated specific
\Vh? they did not prefer to live with their mother,
i.e. she goes out with a married man (T. 352); she doesn't
wash and i1·011 clothes (T. 351, 105); and the meals were
still being prepared late ( T. 365).
The children were unanimous in their selection of their
father as the parent they preferred to live with because he
<lid clo these things for them. Notwithstanding their preference, and notwithstanding all of the reasons and facts
ah·eady discussed, the Trial Court awarded the permanent
custody of the children to the plaintiff. Such a decision
seems to be contrary to the best interests of the children,
the preponderance of the evidence, and to be manifestly
unfair and unjust under the facts of this case.
The children knew that it was one thing for their
mother to be out with an unmarried man and quite another
fol' her to be out with a married man who puts his arm
arnuncl her while alone in the front seat of a truck (T. 358).
They knew it was improper for their mother to steal and

l ti

that she was getting home much later than reasonable or
necessary under the circumstances. If she were leaving
school at 4 :00 p.m. as she testified, but not arriving home
until 5 :30 to 6 :00 p.m. what was the plaintiff doing during
that 1112 to 2 hours each day? The plaintiff stated she
was preparing her lessons better than the defendant (T.
189) but since she wasn't at school or at home, where was
she? The distance from Horace Mann Junior High to 729
Bryan Avenue is less than four miles, so that time was not
spent in just driving home. It was this type of conduct
that caused the children to choose to live with their father.
The Trial Court may have been favorably impressed
with the plaintiff's ability to verbalize what she felt was
her responsibilities as a mother (T. 186), but the record
shows a pronounced credibility gap between her verbalization and her performance.
E.

The permanent custody of the children should be
awarded to the defendant.
Inasmuch as there is no evidence of improper conduct
on the part of the defendant and there is evidence that the
defendant is attentive to the needs of the children (T. 103),
sets a good example for the children (T. 365), is able to
provide the children with moral and religious training, as
well as fulfill the functions of a father and a substitute
mother ( T. 87, 365), and is better able to relate to the
(T. 20), having less emotional or psychological
problems to cope with than does the plaintiff, the defendant
urges that the Trial Court's award of the permanent custody of the children to the plaintiff was not equitable and
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was in eno1·, and th a t th e permanent custody should be
granted to the defendant.
POINT II.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT
HAVE ORD:GRED THE DEFENDANT TO PAY
THE PLAINTIFF AN ADDITIONAL $50.00
PER MONTH PER CHILD AS CHILD SUPPORT.
At the Trial of the matter on August 1, 1969, the defendant testified that he had a net salary of $409.00 per
month (T. 239). He further testified on October 28, 1969,
that he was not sure what his net would be for the year
1969-70, since he had complied with plaintiff's request (T.
197) to allow her to claim all three of the children as her
exemptions for income tax purposes (T. 337).
On August 1, 1969, the defendant was ordered to contilrne making monthly payments on pre-existing family indeLtedness including mortgage payments on the family
home in the aggregate sum of $253.00 (T. 233-236). This
left the defendant with $156.00 per month to live on. The
Trial Court found that the defendant could not possibly
p:i_y anything additional to the plaintiff for the support of
the minor children.
The plaintiff testified on August 1, 1969, that her net
pay check each month was then $532.00 (T. 197) but that
this would be increased since she would be claiming the
three children as exemptions. This Court should take judicial notice that all of the teachers in the Salt Lake School

District also received a pay raise for the school year 196970, commencing in September, 1969. However, at a subsequent hearing on October 28, 1969, the plaintiff testified that her last check was less than $500.00 plus a bonus
of $219.00 (T. 280, line 7). The plaintiff offered this
testimony even though she had received an increase in
her base pay, and had more exemptions to claim. The
apparent conclusion is that the plaintiff was either lying
or had "forgotten" the exact amount of her last check.
The plaintiff did not introduce evidence at the trial
as to her expense requirements each month. However, at
the hearing on October 28, 1969, under cross examindion,
the plaintiff testified as to her expense requirements each
month to support her and the three children, which expenses aggregated $425.00 per month (T. 293-296). The
Court on its own accord and without evidence or showing
of a necessity for the same increased the aggregate allegedly needed by the plaintiff to $520.00 per month.

In its memorandum order of October 3, 1969, the
Trial Court ordered the defendant "to attempt to obtain
extra employment consistent with his teaching obligations," so that the defendant might be able to contribute
some support for the minor children of the parties. On
October 28, 1970, a hearing was held in the matter, at
which time the defendant did testify that he had secured a
part time job at Milne Truck Line (T. 324). The work
was at night time, normally from 9: 30 p.m. to 6: 00 a.m.
and the number of nights he would work in any month was
both uncertain and subject to numerous factors (T. 325-
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326). During the defendant's first two weeks on the job,
he netted $122.00 (T. 326), but the evidence at the hearing
was that the part time job was already having a negative
effect upon the defendant's performance as a teacher of
emotionally disturbed children ( T. 339-340) .
The def enda11t testified that he did not know how
much if any work he would have at the part time job in
the future (T. 325), and plaintiff, through her ::tttorney,
stipulated in open court that she was aware that the defendant's wages would vary from month to month according
to the time the defendant was allowed to work (T. 337).
Nevertheless, on November 3, 1969, the Trial Court informed defendant's counsel by letter (T. 38-39) of its
to require defendant to pay plaintiff an additional
$50.00 per month per child as support, which when added
to the $253.00 the defendant was already paying m1 the
family indebtedness totaled $403.00 per month in support
payments. In making this order for additional support,
the Trial Court found that the defendant had "a net
income from Milne Truck of $220.00 . . . . " (T. 38). The
defendant urges that this finding by the Trial Court is
without basis in fact and was the result of conjecture
and speculation only. In addition, the Trial Court's failure
to consider the testimony of the plaintiff as to her actual
needs and expenses in relationship to actual income is
shmvn by the following evidence in the record.
On August l, 1969, the plaintiff had a net income
<'f $532.00 per month. She testified that between August 1,
. d a "b. o'.lus " of
1969,
October 28, 1969, she rece1v2
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$219.00 for "teJ,ching summer school" (T. 2E?O). She further
testified that in addition, during this period, her mother
had given her either $200.00 (T. 302) or $115.00 (T. 302,
305, line 7) either one sum or the other, but not boch (she
was indefinite as to which), to open a checking account
(T. 302, line 3). By adding the bonus of $219.00 and
$200.00 or $115.00 she received from her mother, the plaintiff had either an extra $419.00 or $334.00 as additional
income from August 1, 1969, to October 28, 1969. During
this same 3 month period, the plaintiff testified that she
was robbed of $120.00 (T. 305) so that her normal income
was effectively only increased by either $299.00 or $214.00.
During this same three months, with no more than
$299.00 more than her normal income, the plaintiff bstified
that she invested $500.00 in a Dreyfus Leverage Fund
(T. 301), paid $10.00 for her personal horsebackriding
lessons (T. 306, lines 3-18); paid $13.00 for a little rug
and $37 .00 to upholster a counter or bar in her bedroom
(T. 306-307); hired an electrician to hang three light fixtures; install a new door bell; and hook up a pump for
the water fall in her ber'lroom (T. 309); paid $35.00 for
a rerdi_nt; ln11p
Auerb:lchs (T. 309 - 310); treat2d
"friemls" to dinner for "20 some odd dollars" (T. 311),
and still ended up with at least $3.29 in her checking account
on the date of the hearing (T. 303), not counting cash she
had 011 her person. During this time there was no evidence
that she vn1s giving h<?r children ;:rny more of her time
and atfontion. In fact,
to the contniry is availth"t she sUll
able, imlsmueh as the chihlrc11 later
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came home late, de. ( T. 365) .
It is beyond reason that the Trial
should feel
that it was a 1;,i;:;2 use of its equity powers to compel the
defendant to secure extra employment to p:,.y &dditionu.l
support to the plaintiff when the only "needs" dt:m01:strated by the record were the plnir.tiff's personal .sxtrnvagances and desires. This ruling by the Tri2l Comt takes
on added repugn2,ncy in view of the fact that the plrcintiif made no showing of a need for additional funds to
SU]Jport the children of the parties, although she did testify
as to her ability to easily live on and maintain the children
from
personal income.

For the Trial Court to place this additional responsil>ility upon the defendant was and is both unjust to the
defendant as a person and a father, as well as to the
emotionally disturbed children whom he must te[lch D.fter
hJ,ving worked for 36 hours or more without sleep or
sufficient time to prepare his teaching materials. Also,
the Trial Court failed to give any weight to the evidence
that the defendant had no control over the amount of
hours or nights that he worked for Milne Truck Line
(T. 325). Such a finding and order is inequitable, unjust
and contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. The
defendant cannot see how such an order can possibly achieve
what this Court announced DeRose v. DeRose, 19 Utah 2d
77, 426 P. 2d 221, ( 1967), was the "desired objective of the
decree· that is to make such arrangement of the property
'
and economic resources of the parties that they will have
the best possible opportunity to reconstruct their lives on a
happy and useful basis."

The defendant urges that under the fact situation of
this case, the Trial Court's finding and order that the
defendant pay the plaintiff $50.00 per month per child as
support should be reversed, and that the support paid by
the defendant to the plaintiff to date be returned to the
defendant.
POINT III.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT
HA VE AW A R D E D THE PLAINTIFF AN
ATTORNEYS FEE OF $550.00 FOR THE USE
AND BENEFIT OF HER ATTORNEY.
The defendant acknowledges the power or authority
of the Trial Court to award attorney's fees. 2 The defendant
further acknowledges that the Trial Court has the prerogative to assess an attorneys fee as part of its power as a
court of equity:i and in its sound discretion when "* * * the
circumstances of the parties are such, that in fairness to
the wife she should be given financial assistance by the
husband". 4
This Court further stated in Griffiths v. Griffiths
3 Utah 2d 82, 278 P.2d 983, ( 1955) that:
"* * * under the facts * * *, where it appears
that the husband is better able to bear the costs of
divorce and no gross or immoral conduct has been
proved against the defendant [wife], the wife,
2section 30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953), Replacement Volume
3).

3Christensen v. ChristensPn. 18 Utah 2d 315, 422 P. 2d 534 (1967).
,Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah :i!13, 179 P. 2d 1005. (1047).
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although the losing party, should be allowed suit
money."
In the Cl'iiiiths cas2 (snpr.1), this Court cited the
case of Alldredge v. Alld1 edge, 119 Utah GQ.ci, 229 P.2d 681
(1951). The Alldredge cas2 sets forth the reasoni·:g
public policy involved in gwarding a wife suit money.
The language of the court is as follows:
"The reason for permitting wife suit money
to defend an action for divorce rests oa the ground
that the wife normally has no separate estate from
which to pay for bringing or def ending the action.
This is the situation in the case at hand. Not to
allow the wife expenses and counsel fees would in
the majority of cases work an injustice by denying
her the power to enforce any marital rights she
might have. Here, as in the case of alimony, gross
or immoral conduct may cause a denial of attorneys
fees, but such conduct was not found in this case
* * * *" (page 687).
The defendant will show that the Trial Court erred
in awarding an attorneys fee to the plaintiff for three
reasons, namely: ( 1) The award was not supported
by competent evidence; (2) The award was contrary
to public policy, and (3) The plaintiff's conduct was
of such a nature so as to bar her claim for attorneys fees.
Each of these are hereinafter considered.
A.

The Trial Court's award was not supported by
competent evidence.

The transcript is void of any proof that the defendant
was better equipped or able than the plaintiff to bear the
costs of the divorce. In fact, testimony indic2.tes that the

plaintiff was better able than the defendant to bear the
costs of the divorce.
The defendant testified that he had had to borrow
money in order to pay his attorney a fee of $5'50.00,
pay his insurance premiums, and for necessary repairs and
expenses on his car (T. 331. During this same time, the
plaintiff testified that despite the fact that she had been
robbed of $120.00, that she was able to invest $500.00
in a Dreyfus Leverage Fund (T. 301); paid $10.00 for
personal horesbackriding lessons (T. 306); paid $13.00
for a little rug and $37 .00 to upholster a counter or bar in
her bedroom (T. 306); hired an electrician to hang three
light fixtures, install a new door bell, and hook up a pump
for the waterfall in her bedroom (T. 309-310); treated
friends to dinner for "20 some odd dollars" (T. 311), still
had a credit balance in her checking account, ;:md was
able to pay for all of the expe1;ses of operating her home
and caring for her family.
The earnings and obligations of the ;Ltrties
nr.c:viously been discussed in detail in relationship to the issue
of support money, and the testimony referl'c;d to in that
argument is fully applicable here to establish the fr,ct that
there is no competent evidence upon v.·hic:h the
Conrt
could have concluded thd the defondant 1vas b2tte1· J>'e
to finance th:: plaintiff's litigation,
was the
'r
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that ths ph;;ntiff ·w;:is Leti:nr ;>_ble to i)ear the ex112r.ses of
bringing her ;•:·tior,
the defer:d;;nt. It is 1'!1 i nc;t
and inequit<lble to compel the ckfend8.nt to honov,·
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money to pay the plaintiffs attorney, so as to provide the
plaintiff with free litigation when she herself has assets
and income sufficient to pay her attorney, and yet the
order of the Trial Court leaves the defendant no other
choice if it is to be complied with.
B.

The Trial Courts award was contrary to the public
policy or reason for the mvard of attorney fees
in divorce cases.

As stated by this Court in the Alldredge case (supra),
the reason for permitting the wife suit money is because
she normally has no separate estate for her own. In the
case at hand, while neither party had a }[,rge estate, the
p1aintiff had more assets upon which to rely than did the
defendant. The plaintiff had a greater income than the
defendant as a result of her tenure with the Board of
Education (T. 197). She had less indebtedness of the
family to pay off, she had more discretionary money at her
disposal, and she was able to purchase while this action
was pending in the Trial Court, $500.00 worth of the
Dreyfus Leverage Fund.
Since the reason for allowing the wife suit fees is
because she "normally has no separate estate from which
to pD.y for bringing or defending the action," see Alldredge
u. Alldredr;e, su11rn, and since that reason does not exist
in the instance case, the award of attorneys fees to the
plaintiff in this matter was contrary to the public policy
or reason, behind the law that grants the Trial Court the
discretion to award the same.
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C.

The gross misconduct of the plaintiff should bar
her claim for attorneys fees.

This Court has made it clear that in the event of
gross or immoral conduct on the part of the wife, that
her claim to attorneys fees should be barred. Griffiths v.
Griffith, supra. The defendant urges that the testimony
clearly shows the conduct of the plaintiff to be gross and
perhaps immoral.
The testimony was that she was found parked with
another man on two or more occasions (T. 227, 229); that
she wns regularly escorted to and from meetings or other
places by this same man (T. 229); that she refused
to explain her absence from the home to her husband
(T. 103); that she made fun of her husband's attempts to
ascertain what her activities were (T. 103); that she refused to discontinue her activities with other men (T. 228);
that she massaged or rubbed a fellow employee's feet in
front of her husband and children (T. 96); that she was
locked in her bedroom with a married man late at night
where her oldest son found her when the man's wife came
to find him (T. 118); that she allowed another married
man to put his arm around her while riding alone together
in the front seat of a truck (T. 352); and that she refused
to accommodate her husband as a wife (T. 233). If such
conduct on the part of the wife is not immoral, it surely
is gross conduct, and in either event, the plaintiff should
not be a\varded an attorneys fee.

CONCLUSION
This Court has made it clear that it will not disturb
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the findings and orders of the Trial Court, "unless it
appears to be unjust, inequitable and contrary to the evidence ,and theref..:1re an abuse of disecretion," see McIJrnoin
v. McBroom, supra. As demonstrated by the foregoing
the findings and orders of the Trial Court
regarding the custody of the children, the payment of child
support and the indebtedness of the parties, which are contrary to the evidence, and are, therefore, an abuse of its
discretion.
This Court, by directing the Trial Court to award the
permanent custody of the children to the defendant, and
for the Trial Court to make additional findings regarding
support and the indebtedness of the parties, which are consistent with the award of the children to the defendant, will
accomplish the desired equitable objectives of any decree,
namely to make such arrangements as well give the parties
the best possible opportunity to reconstruct their lives on
a happy basis.
Respectfully submitted,
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